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Abstract
This paper develops an overlapping-generations model including wage inequality
within a generation and intra- and intergenerational resource reallocation via social
security. Based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper
focuses on the feedback mechanism between current individuals’ decisions on saving
and future voting on social security. The paper demonstrates the determination of
social security via probabilistic voting and its consequence for consumption inequal-
ity within a generation. It is shown that when the elderly are politically powerful,
(i) the economy attains an oscillatory path of inequality and social security, and (ii)
aging may reduce consumption inequality.
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1 Introduction
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems are at the center of public sector expen-
diture in many OECD countries. Benefit levels and contribution rates are determined in
the political process and thus affected by political conflict between the beneficiaries (the
elderly) and the contributors (the young). In order to assess the efficiency of existing
social security and to obtain a prediction of the future of social security, there is a need
to develop a politico-economic framework that incorporates this political conflict between
generations.
A key to the development of the framework is a feedback mechanism between social
security policy and individual decision making. Expectations about future policy affect
current individuals’ decision making on saving or education, which in turn has an effect
on the future distribution of income and thus on the future voting behavior on the pol-
icy. Several researchers have provided politico-economic frameworks that incorporate this
feedback mechanism based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
(see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1998; Azariadis and Galasso, 2002; Hassler et
al., 2003; Forni, 2005; Hassler et al., 2005; Bassetto, 2007; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt,
2007; Song, 2007).
Social security has a role of intragenerational redistribution via its Beveridgean part
in addition to intergenerational redistribution. However, the above-mentioned studies ab-
stracted the intragenerational redistribution aspect by assuming identical agents within
a generation. Some researchers have considered the politics of intragenerational redis-
tribution, but abstracted the feedback mechanism by assuming once-and-for-all voting
(Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000, 2001; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007; Koethen-
buerger, Poutvaara and Profeta, 2008). They did not mention the political effect of social
security on inequality within a generation. Therefore, the question arises of whether or
not the politics of social security has an effect on intragenerational redistribution, and
thus on inequality, within a generation in the presence of the feedback mechanism. The
answer is no, but it is only for the case of wealth inequality under a pure Bismarckian
scheme (Song, 2007).1
The aim of this paper is to characterize the dynamic political economy of social security
and consumption inequality under a social security system including the Beveridgean
and the Bismarckian parts. In addition, we consider population aging resulting from a
decline in fertility rates, and investigate how aging affects social security and consumption
1Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2005) also analyzed income inequality within a generation,
but there is no capital accumulation in their framework. In addition, their focus is different from Song
(2007) and ours. They focus on the endogenous determination of income inequality affected by politics;
Song (2007) and our paper assume income inequality as given and focus on endogenous determination of
wealth inequality (Song, 2007) or consumption inequality (the current paper) affected by politics.
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inequality through the political process. Therefore, the paper provides dynamic political-
economy implications of aging, inequality and social security.2
For the purpose of analysis, we develop a simple two-period overlapping-generations
model with a linear production function and a quasi-linear utility function. Agents differ
in their working ability and thus in their labor income in youth; they retire in old age and
receive social security benefits. The pension benefit consists of two parts: a contributory
part (Bismarckian) and a noncontributory part (Beveridgean). This pension benefit is
determined in a probabilistic voting framework (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). We utilize
the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium where the social security tax rate
is conditioned on capital as a state variable.
Under the framework presented above, the current paper shows the following two
results. First, the political power of the elderly related to aging plays a key role in
determining the dynamic patterns of inequality and social security. When the political
power of the elderly is weak, the economy displays a monotone path of inequality and
social security toward the steady state. On the other hand, when their power is strong,
the economy displays an oscillatory convergence toward, or a period-two cycle around,
the steady state.
Second, the model presents the opposite economic and political effects of aging on
the size of the social security similar to Galasso and Profeta (2004, 2007). Given this
result, we examine the effect of aging on consumption inequality (evaluated in terms of
utility). It is shown that under a pure Beveridgean scheme, aging results in a lower level
of inequality when the political power of the elderly is strong. Under a pure Bismarckian
scheme, aging results in a lower level of inequality when the initial population growth
rate is low. The result implies that aging may reduce consumption inequality through the
political process.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model and char-
acterizes economic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes a Ramsey allocation defined as
a feasible plan chosen by a benevolent social planner. Section 4 characterizes a politi-
cal equilibrium, shows its existence and stability, compares it to the Ramsey allocation
and analyzes the effect of aging on the amount of social security. Section 5 presents the
dynamics of inequality and investigates the effect of aging on consumption inequality.
Section 6 discusses the assumptions of this paper. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
The proofs are provided in the appendix.
2There are several studies analyzing the political economy of social security focusing on the role of
social security systems (see, for example, Casamatta et al., 2000, 2001; Cremer et al., 2007; Conde-Ruiz
and Profeta, 2007; Koethenbuerger, Poutvaara and Profeta, 2008). However, these studies focus on the
steady state by assuming once-and-for-all voting; the dynamic motion of social security and inequality is
abstracted from their analysis.
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2 The Model and Economic Equilibrium
Consider an overlapping-generations model where the economy is composed of individuals
and perfectly competitive firms. Time is discrete and denoted as t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . A new
generation is born in each period t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . The size of a generation born in period
t (generation t) is given by N t. The population grows at a constant rate n > −1 :
N t = (1 + n)N t−1.
Individuals in each generation live for two periods: youth and old age. Each individual
is endowed with one unit of labor in youth, supplies it inelastically to firms, and retires
in old age. An individual has a probability λ ∈ (0, 1) to be endowed with the high
productivity wh > 0 and a probability 1−λ to be endowed with the low productivity wl ∈
(0, wh). Individuals with wi are referred to as type i(= h, l). The average productivity
is assumed to be fixed and given by w¯ = λwh + (1− λ)wl. The aggregate effective labor
supply in period t is given by Lt = (λw
h + (1− λ)wl)N t.
To obtain analytical results, we assume a linear production function in which gross
output, Y, is produced using labor, L, and capital, K : Yt = Lt + RKt. The wage rate,
1, and the gross rental price of capital, R, are determined by the marginal productivity
conditions for factor prices and are already substituted into the production function. For
simplicity, the two types of labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production in
terms of efficiency units of labor input, and capital is assumed to fully depreciate at the
end of the production process.
A type-i individual in generation t evaluates consumption bundles (cyit , c
oi
t+1) by the
utility function U it = u(cyit ) + βc
oi
t+1 where c
yi
t represents the consumption at time t of
type i young individual and coit+1 represents the consumption at time t + 1 of type i old
individual. β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor. The function u is concave and twice
continuously differentiable with limc→0 u′(c) = +∞. Quasi-linearity of U it implies that
all income effects are absorbed by old age consumption. The role of this assumption will
be discussed in Section 6.
A type-i individual is subject to a type-independent payroll tax τt ∈ [0, 1] and expects
the type-dependent old age pension bit+1. He/she can allocate his/her disposable labor
income between consumption cyit and saving z
i
t. When he/she retires, his/her consumption
coit+1 is equal to the gross return on saving, Rz
i
t, plus the pension benefit, b
i
t+1. Formally,
type i individual solves the following problem:
max
zit=0
u(cyit ) + βc
oi
t+1
s.t. cyit + z
i
t = (1− τt)wi,
coit+1 = Rz
i
t + b
i
t+1.
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The first-order condition associated with an interior solution of zit is:
u′(cyit ) = βR for i = h, l, (1)
or:
cyit = c¯
y ≡ u′−1(βR) for i = h, l. (2)
With (2) and the budget constraints, the saving and the old-age consumption of type i
are given by, respectively:
zit = (1− τt)wi − c¯y, (3)
coit+1 = R · {(1− τt)wi − c¯y}+ bit+1. (4)
Because of the assumption of the quasi-linear utility function, the consumption in youth
is type-independent and constant over time, and the saving is independent of the pension
benefit bit+1.
3 We assume that pension benefit of type-i, bit+1, consists of two parts: a
contributory part that is directly related to individual earning, wi, and a noncontributory
part that depends on average earnings, w¯. With a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme, the
average return of the social security system is given by the population growth rate. These
properties yield the following expression for bit+1:
bit+1 = (1 + n) · τt+1 · (αwi + (1− α)w¯). (5)
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the Bismarckian factor that is the fraction of the pension
benefits that is related to contributions. When α = 1, the pension scheme is pure Bis-
marckian or contributory; when α = 0, pension benefits are uniform and the scheme is
Beveridgean. The case of an endogenous choice of α by voting is discussed in Section 6.
At the start of the economy, time 0, there are young agents in generation 0 as well as
the initial old agents. A type-i initial old agent is endowed with zi−1 units of saving at
the beginning of period 0 and obtains the return Rzi−1 and the pension benefit b
i
0, which
are consumed.
Definition 1: For a given sequence of taxes, {τt}∞t=0, the initial condition zi−1 > 0(i =
h, l) and a set of parameters, (n, α, wh, wl, λ, R), an economic equilibrium is a se-
3The saving function indicates that for type-l individuals, there is a possibility of zlt < 0. This implies
that type-l individuals want to borrow from type-h individuals in the credit market in order to finance
their consumption in youth. This paper assumes that such borrowing is available for type-l individuals:
there is no limit of access to the credit market. Although a borrowing constraint may provide interesting
results and implications for the political economy (see, for example, Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007),
this paper leaves this for future research and instead focuses on the interaction between aging, inequality
and social security under the condition of no credit constraint.
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quence of allocations,
{
cyit , c
oi
t+1, z
i
t, b
i
t, Kt}∞t=0 , such that (i) the utility maximization
problem is solved for each type i; (ii) the social security budget constraint is bal-
anced in every period, N t(λbht+1 + (1− λ)blt+1) = N t+1(λwh + (1− λ)wl)τt+1, under
the benefit rule (5); and (iii) the capital market clears: Kt+1 = N
t(λzht +(1−λ)zlt).
Let kt ≡ Kt/N t denote capital per young person in period t. Given a sequence of
taxes, {τt}∞t=0, and the initial condition k0 > 0, an equilibrium sequence of kt, {kt}∞t=0, is
characterized by:
(1 + n)kt+1 = (1− τt)w¯ − c¯y. (6)
3 Ramsey Allocation
In this section, we characterize a Ramsey allocation defined as a feasible plan chosen by
a benevolent social planner who can commit to a policy sequence at time zero. The
allocation maximizes the following objective function:
W = β
{
λcoh0 + (1− λ)col0
}
+
∑∞
t=0 η
t+1
[
λ
{
u(cyht ) + βc
oh
t+1
}
+ (1− λ)
{
u(cylt ) + βc
ol
t+1
}]
subject to
cyit = c¯
y, coit+1 = R · {(1− τt)wi − c¯y}+ bit+1,
λzht + (1− λ)zlt ≥ 0,
where cyit and c
oi
t+1 are households’ consumption functions and the third inequality is the
nonnegative constraint of aggregate saving. The planner discounts future generations’
utilities with a discount factor of η ∈ (0, 1).
The Ramsey problem described above is dynamic in nature, but it admits a simple
static representation. To show this, we substitute households’ budget constraints into the
objective function to obtain:
W = βR{λzh−1 + (1− λ)zl−1}+ W˜ ,
where
W˜ ≡∑∞t=0 ηt [βw¯{(1 + n)− ηR}τ + η{u(c¯y) + βR(w¯ − c¯y)}] .
The problem reduces to a sequence of identical static optimization problems over τ .
Let τR denote the solution to the Ramsey problem described above. We establish the
following result.
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Proposition 1: The Ramsey allocation has
τR

= w¯−c¯
y
w¯
if 1 + n > ηR,
∈ [0, w¯−c¯y
w¯
]
if 1 + n = ηR,
= 0 if 1 + n < ηR.
Figure 1 shows the tax rate in the Ramsey allocation as a function of the population
growth rate, n. For 1 + n < (>)ηR, the return from intergenerational transfer 1 + n
is lower (higher) than the return from saving, R, multiplied by the discount factor η
from the viewpoint of the social planner. Therefore, the planner chooses τR = 0(= 1)
if 1 + n < (>)ηR. For 1 + n = ηR, the planner is indifferent between the two ways of
resource reallocation.
[Figure 1 about here.]
4 Political Equilibrium
This section characterizes a political equilibrium. Section 3.1 provides the definition of
political equilibrium based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium with
probabilistic voting. Section 3.2 provides the characterization of the political equilibrium
path of capital and tax rate. We then focus on the steady-state political equilibrium and
show the existence and stability of the steady-state equilibrium. In Section 3.3, based
on the characterization of the steady-state equilibrium, we examine how the size of the
welfare state, represented by the tax rate, is affected by population aging resulting from
a decline in the fertility rate.
4.1 The Political Environment
The tax rate τt is chosen by some repeated political process at the beginning of each
period. This paper assumes that τt is determined in a probabilistic voting framework
(see, for example, Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In this framework, political decision
makers’ platforms in period t simply maximize a weighted average utility of all voters
alive in that period. Thus, the equilibrium policy maximizes a political objective function
given by:
Gt = γ ·
[
λcoht + (1− λ)colt
]
+(1 + n) ·
[
λ
{
u(cyht ) + βc
oh
t+1
}
+ (1− λ)
{
u(cylt ) + βc
ol
t+1
}]
,
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where the political weight on the old is given by γ ∈ [0,∞) and the weight on the young
is given by the gross rate of population growth. When γ = 0, only the young are entitled
to vote; when γ > 0, both the young and the old vote on the tax rate. A greater weight
on the old implies that they have greater political power.
We focus on a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, in which the state of the economy
is summarized by the stock of capital per young person in the economy. We restrict the
choice of political decision makers to the Markovian policy function:
τt = θ(kt),
where θ(·) is a stationary, differentiable function. Let the political decision maker in
period t, with expectations θe(kt+1) about the period t + 1 tax rate find it optimal to
set the transfer θ(kt). The decision maker’s expectations about the future are consistent
with the incentives that will actually face the future decision maker if and only if θ = θe.
Formally, the Markov perfect equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2: AMarkov perfect political equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, {cyit , coit+1, zit, bit, kt}∞t=0
and a differentiable policy function θ(·) such that (i) conditions at Definition 1 (eco-
nomic equilibrium) are satisfied; and (ii) θ(·) is a fixed point of the mapping from
θe(·) to θ(·), where θ(·) is the solution to the policy maker’s problem and θe(·) is
the expected policy function.
4.2 Existence and Stability of Political Equilibrium
In order to find the solution to the problem of maximization Gt, we take the derivative
of the objective function Gt with respect to θ(kt), which yields:
∂Gt
∂θ(kt)
= γλ(1 + n)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗1)
+ γ(1− λ)(1 + n) (αwl + (1− α)w¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗2)
+(1 + n)λ
{
−βRwh + β(1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗3)
+(1 + n)(1− λ)
{
−βRwl + β(1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwl + (1− α)w¯)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗4)
,
where the term (*1) ((*2)) represents the marginal benefit for high-productivity (low-
productivity) old people, and comes from the increase in θ(kt). The term (*3)((*4)) rep-
resents the sum of the marginal cost and benefit for high-productivity (low-productivity)
young people, and comes from the increase in θ(kt) and the increase in θ(kt+1) through
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a change in θ(kt), respectively. The derivation of the above equation is provided in the
appendix.
Because we have (1 + n)kt+1 = (1 − θ(kt))w¯ − c¯y in equilibrium, it follows that
∂kt+1/∂θ(kt) = −w¯/(1+n). Substituting this derivative into the condition of ∂Gt/∂θ(kt) =
0 and rearranging the terms, we obtain the differential equation ∂θ(kt+1)/∂kt+1 = −µ
where:
µ ≡ βR− γ
βw¯
.
The parameter µ takes a positive or negative value depending on the sizes of β, γ and R.4
Integrating the differential equation, ∂θ(kt+1)/∂kt+1 = −µ, we obtain:
θ(kt+1) = A− µkt+1. (7)
The constant of integration, A, is a free parameter that is determined by the first decision
maker’s expectation of future policies. Any period-t decision maker, who expects the next
decision maker to choose the policy according to (7), is indifferent between all feasible
taxes. That is, given the expectation that θe(kt+1) = A − µkt+1, ∂Gt/∂θ(kt) = 0 holds
for all θ(kt) ∈ [0, 1]. This is because a change in θ(kt) would be exactly compensated
by a corresponding change in θe(kt+1), driven by a variation in kt+1. Therefore, every
decision maker is willing to act according to (7), lagged one period, in order to validate
the previous decision maker’s expectations.
The equilibrium policy function θ(kt) = A− µkt can be combined with the accumula-
tion equation (6) to derive the following law of motion for the stock of capital:
kt+1 =
w¯(1− A)− c¯y
1 + n
+
µw¯
1 + n
kt. (8)
Using this law of motion and the policy function, we can write the law of motion of the
equilibrium tax as:
θt+1 = A− µ(w¯ − c¯
y)
1 + n
+
µw¯
1 + n
θt. (9)
We impose the following assumption (Assumption 1) to ensure that given kt > 0, kt+1 > 0
and θt ∈ [0, 1) hold.5
Assumption 1: w¯ > c¯y = u′−1(βR).
4For example, assume that a generation is 30 years in length and set β = (0.98)30 and γ = 1. The
value of β is based on the single-period discount rate found by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) of 0.98.
The value of γ implies that the old have equal political power with the young. If the single-period gross
interest rate is given by 1.02, then βR = (0.98×1.02)30 < γ = 1 : µ takes a negative value. Alternatively,
if it is given by 1.03, then βR = (0.98× 1.03)30 > γ = 1 : µ takes a positive value.
5In the Appendix (Section 8.4), it is shown that under Assumption 1, there exists a nonempty set of
kt that leads to kt+1 > 0 and θt ∈ [0, 1).
9
The political equilibrium attains a steady state if a sequence of capital and tax is
stationary over time: kt = kt+1 = k¯ and θt = θt+1 = θ¯. Suppose that there is a steady
state with k¯ > 0 and θ¯ ∈ [0, 1). Equations (8) and (9) imply that the equilibrium sequence
of {kt, θt} displays monotone convergence toward the steady state if µw¯/(1 + n) ∈ (0, 1);
constant levels over time if µw¯/(1+n) = 0; oscillatory convergence toward the steady state
if µw¯/(1+n) ∈ (−1, 0); and a period-two cycle around the steady state if µw¯/(1+n) = −1.
Therefore, we impose the following assumption (Assumption 2) on the set of parameters to
ensure the stability of the interior steady state. Figure 2 illustrates the set of parameters
that satisfies Assumption 2 in a R− γ space.
Assumption 2: 0 < (1+n)−µw¯ and 0 ≤ (1+n)+µw¯, i.e., γ ∈ (β(R− (1+n)), β(R+
(1 + n))].
[Figure 2 about here.]
Define two critical values of the free parameter A as:
Alow ≡ µ(w¯ − c¯
y)
1 + n
, Ahigh ≡ w¯ − c¯
y
w¯
. (10)
Using these definitions, we establish the existence of a steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 2: If A ∈ [Alow, Ahigh), there exists a steady-state equilibrium with
k¯ =
w¯(1− A)− c¯y
(1 + n)− µw¯ > 0 and θ¯ =
(1 + n)A− µ(w¯ − c¯y)
(1 + n)− µw¯ ∈ [0, 1).
If A = Alow, then θ¯ = 0; if A ∈ (Alow, Ahigh), then θ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
To understand the result shown in Proposition 2, consider the case of µ > 0(that is,
βR > γ) as an example. First, k¯ > 0 is rewritten as A < Ahigh. This implies that if the
expectation parameter A is high such that A ≥ Ahigh, the tax rate is too high to save:
there is no resource remaining for saving and thus no accumulation of capital. Second,
θ¯ < 1 always holds under the condition of A < Ahigh that requires k¯ > 0. Finally, θ¯ ≥ 0
is rewritten as A ≥ Alow. If A < Alow, the tax rate becomes negative. Therefore, there
exists a steady-state political equilibrium with k¯ > 0 and θ¯ ∈ [0, 1) if A is set within the
range [Alow, Ahigh).
The result established in Proposition 2 indicates that the steady-state levels of capital
and tax are independent of the parameter α representing the degree of redistribution via
the pension system. This result depends on the following two assumptions: (i) the quasi-
linear utility function of individuals; and (ii) the political objective function defined as the
weighted sum of utilities of individuals. Because of these assumptions, the terms related
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to the parameter α are displayed in a linear form and thus redistribution effects on types
l and h offset each other. Therefore, the parameter α has no effect on the determination
of capital and tax. However, as we will show in Section 5, the redistribution effect on
consumption still remains under these assumptions, implying that the pension system has
an effect on consumption inequality.
Having shown the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with k¯ > 0, we next examine
stability of the steady state. Equations (8) and (9) indicate that if µ = 0(βR = γ), the
levels of capital and tax are constant over time. On the other hand, if µ 6= 0(βR 6= γ),
the time paths of capital and tax display dynamics tending toward or around the steady
state. The stability property for the latter case is formally summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: Assume that µ 6= 0(βR 6= γ). Given k0 ∈ ((c¯y − w¯)/µw¯+A/µ,A/µ] if
µ > 0 (i.e., γ < βR) or k0 ∈ [A/µ, (c¯y−w¯)/µw¯+A/µ) if µ < 0 (i.e., γ > βR), there
exists an equilibrium sequence of (kt, θt)
∞
t=0 displaying (i) monotone convergence to-
ward the interior steady-state equilibrium if γ ∈ (β(R−(1+n)), βR); (ii) oscillatory
convergence toward the interior steady-state equilibrium if γ ∈ (βR, β(R+(1+n)));
and (iii) a period-two cycle around the interior steady-state equilibrium if γ =
β(R + (1 + n)).
The conditions of the parameters β,R, γ and n for the stability property are imme-
diately found by equations (8) and (9). For the result established in Proposition 3, two
remarks are in order. First, the relative magnitude between the political weight on the
old, γ, and the gross interest rate multiplied by the discount factor, βR, plays a key role
in determining the stability property of the equilibrium path. A larger γ leads to a higher
tax rate because the old have greater political power in policy decision making, while a
larger βR leads to a lower tax rate because a higher return from saving ensures a higher
level of consumption in the second period of the life cycle, thereby giving the policy maker
an incentive to set a lower current tax rate. Given these competing effects, if γ < (>)βR,
i.e., if µ > (<)0, the former effect is smaller (larger) than the latter effect, implying that
an increase in the current capital stock, kt, results in a lower (higher) tax burden and thus
an increase (a decrease) in the capital stock in the next period. Therefore, the political
economy displays a monotone (an oscillatory) sequence of capital if γ < (>)βR, i.e., if
µ > (<)0.
Second, the property of the equilibrium path depends on the expectation parameter
A. To see this, suppose first that γ < βR: the economy displays a monotone convergence
toward the steady state. If A is set within the range (Alow, Ahigh), the economy displays an
increasing or decreasing sequence of the tax depending on the initial condition. However, if
A = Alow, there is no increasing sequence of the tax because the steady-state tax is given
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by θ¯ = 0; the economy displays only a decreasing sequence of the tax. Alternatively,
suppose that γ > βR: the economy displays an oscillatory convergence toward, or a
period-two cycle around, the steady state. In this case, the policy parameter A must be
set within the range (Alow, Ahigh). If A = Alow, the sequence of tax is unfeasible because
θ1 < 0 holds for a given θ0 > 0.
Figure 1 compares the politically determined tax rate (the political tax rate) to the tax
rate in the Ramsey allocation (the Ramsey tax rate). Comparison is made for the follow-
ing three cases. First, if the gross rate of population growth is low such that 1 + n < ηR,
the political tax rate is generally higher than the Ramsey tax rate. The political equi-
librium resembles the Ramsey allocation if and only if the expectation parameter A is
unexpectedly set at A = Alow. Second, if the gross rate of population growth is high
such that 1 + n > ηR, the political tax rate is lower than the Ramsey tax rate. The
Ramsey allocation requires 100% taxation because resource reallocation via intergener-
ational transfer yields a higher return than that via private saving. However, political
equilibrium attains a lower tax rate than that required by the Ramsey allocation because
of the political power of the young, who want to avoid a tax burden. Finally, if the gross
rate of population growth is by chance equal to ηR, any political tax rate is efficient
because the Ramsey allocation attains indeterminate tax rates given by the set [0, 1].
Therefore, the comparison provides the following implication for political equilibrium in
terms of efficiency: the political economy attains an antiwelfare state when it has a high
rate of population growth whereas it attains a prowelfare state when it has a low rate of
population growth.
4.3 Population Aging and the Size of the Welfare State
Based on the characterization of the political equilibrium, we now consider how the size of
the welfare state, represented by the tax rate θ, is affected by population aging represented
by a decrease in population growth (n).
Proposition 4: Suppose that γ ∈ (β(R − (1 + n)), β(R + (1 + n))): the equilibrium
path displays a stable convergence toward the steady state with θ¯ ∈ (0, 1). A lower
population growth rate leads to a smaller (constant, larger) size of the welfare state
if and only if µ > (=, <)0: ∂θ¯/∂n R 0 if and only if µ R 0, i.e., βR R γ.
The result for the case of µ = 0 is immediately apparent from the fact of θ¯ = A. To
understand the results for the case of µ 6= 0, we first focus our attention on the capital
market-clearing condition in the steady state derived from (8): (1 + n)k¯ = (1 − (A −
µk¯))w¯ − c¯y and consider the effects of the parameters n and γ on the steady-state level
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of capital. We then turn our focus to the policy function θ = A − µk and consider the
effects of n and γ on the tax rate via the steady-state level of capital.
Figure 3 illustrates the steady-state level of capital given by the point at the intersec-
tion of (1 + n)k with (1− (A− µk))w¯− c¯y. As illustrated in Figure 3, a lower population
growth leads to a higher level of per capita capital for both cases of µ > 0 and µ < 0.
This is because, given the aggregate level of capital, a smaller size of population leads to
a higher level of per capita capital. Given the policy function θ¯ = A−µk¯, a higher level of
per capita capital results in a lower (higher) level of tax rate if and only if µ > (<)0, i.e.,
βR > (<)γ. The relative magnitude between βR and γ is important for the determination
of the effect of aging on the size of the welfare system.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The terms βR and γ indicate that population aging has two opposite economic and
political effects on the size of the welfare state (see, for example, Razin, Sadka and Swagel,
2002; Galasso and Profeta, 2004, 2007). The economic effect is captured by the increase
in the share of retirees to workers, which reduces the profitability of a pay-as-you-go social
security system compared to saving. This effect is represented by the term βR. A larger
R implies that the pay-as-you-go social security system is less profitable than saving,
which gives individuals an incentive to downsize the social security system. The political
effect is captured by a decrease in the political weight for the young, that is, an increase
in the political weight for the old. This effect is represented by the term γ. A larger
γ implies that the political power of the old becomes stronger and thus a larger social
security system is supported by voting. The overall effect of aging depends on the relative
magnitude between the two terms βR and γ.
5 Inequality
This section introduces an index that measures an inequality between the two types of
agents in terms of consumption, i.e., lifetime utility. We focus on inequality of economic
welfare by consumption rather than income because consumption reflects not only current
income but also lifetime resources. For the purpose of analysis, we define the index of the
lifetime utility inequality as:
It =
u(c¯y) + β
[
R{(1− θ(kt))wh − c¯y}+ (1 + n)θ(kt+1)(αwh + (1− α)w¯)
]
u(c¯y) + β [R{(1− θ(kt))wl − c¯y}+ (1 + n)θ(kt+1)(αwl + (1− α)w¯)] ,
where the numerator and the denominator represent the lifetime utilities of types h and
l, respectively. Based on this measure, we investigate how inequality changes over time
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(Section 5.1). We also consider how inequality is affected by population aging (Section
5.2). For the tractability of analysis, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3: u(c¯y) ≥ βRc¯y.
Assumption 3 guarantees that the level of the lifetime utility for each type of agent is
greater than zero. Since the utility level of type h is greater than the utility level of type
l, the index takes a value between one and infinity under Assumption 3: It ∈ (1,∞). A
higher It implies greater inequality in terms of lifetime utility. If u(c¯
y) = βRc¯y, the index
is identical to that measuring the lifetime income inequality.
5.1 Dynamics of Inequality
This section investigates the time path of inequality. The inequality index It is rewritten
as a function of kt by using the law of motion for capital (8). Thus, we can display the
time path of the lifetime utility (or income) inequality based on the dynamics of capital
accumulation presented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 5
(i) Suppose that µ > 0, i.e., γ < βR. The inequality is increased by capital accumulation:
∂It/∂kt > 0.
(ii) Suppose that µ < 0, i.e., γ > βR. The inequality is nonincreased by capital accumula-
tion, i.e., ∂It/∂kt ≤ 0, if c¯y < (1+n)w¯/{(1+n)−µw¯} and A ∈ (−µc¯y/(1+n), Ahigh).
In order to interpret the result established in Proposition 5, we differentiate It with
respect to kt and rearrange the terms to obtain:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
= R
∂θ(kt)
∂kt
(−wh + wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + (1 + n)θ(kt+1)(1− α)w¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor income effect
+(1 + n)
∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wh − wl)
 Bismarckian effect︷ ︸︸ ︷α(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) Beveridgean effect︷ ︸︸ ︷−(1− α)w¯βR(1− θ(kt))

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pension effect
,
(11)
where the first term shows the effect of capital on inequality through labor income and
the second term shows the effect of capital on inequality through the pension benefit. The
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second term includes the two effects via the Bismarckian and Beveridgean parts of the
pension benefit.
Suppose that µ > 0: a higher level of capital results in a lower tax rate and a higher
level of the following period’s capital: ∂θ(kt)/∂kt = ∂θ(kt)/∂kt = −µ < 0 and ∂kt+1/∂kt =
µw¯/(1+n) > 0. Given these results, there are three effects of capital on inequality. First,
both types of agents benefit from a decrease in the tax burden, but the marginal benefit
for type h, wh, is greater than the marginal benefit for type l, wl. The effect via labor
income is negative in terms of equality. Second, because of a decrease in the tax rate,
both types of agents are harmed by a decrease in the Bismarckian part of the pension
benefit, but the marginal loss for type h, wh, is greater than that for type l, wl. The effect
via the Bismarckian part is thus positive in terms of equality. Third, both types of agents
suffer the same degree of loss in the Beveridgean part of the pension benefit. This implies
that the effect via the Beveridgean part is negative in terms of equality. In equilibrium,
the sum of the first and the third negative effects overcomes the second positive one.
Therefore, if µ > 0, inequality is increased by capital accumulation.
Alternatively, suppose that µ < 0: a higher level of capital results in a higher tax rate
and a lower level of the next period’s capital: ∂θ(kt)/∂kt = ∂θ(kt)/∂kt = −µ > 0 and
∂kt+1/∂kt = µw¯/(1+n) < 0. The three effects observed for the case of µ > 0 are reversed:
the effect via the labor income effect is positive; the effect via the Bismarckian part is
negative; and the effect via the Beveridgean part is positive. The sum of the positive
effects is equal to or greater than the negative one if A ∈ [−µc¯y/(1 + n), Ahigh). This set
is nonempty if c¯y < (1 + n)/{(1 + n)− µw¯}.
The result established in Proposition 5 suggests that the dynamic pattern of inequality
depends on the political power of the elderly. When the political power of the elderly is
weak such that µ > 0 (i.e., γ < βR), the economy experiences an expanding (shrinking)
inequality along the transition toward the steady state if the initial level of capital is
below (above) the steady-state level. However, when the political power is strong such
that µ < 0 (i.e., γ > βR), it may experience fluctuation of inequality along the transition
toward the steady state. The result indicates that the property of inequality dynamics
depends heavily on the political power of the elderly.
5.2 Population Aging and Inequality
This section focuses on the steady-state level of inequality and investigates how inequality
is affected by population aging via the political determination of social security. For
the tractability of analysis, we focus on two extreme social security systems, the pure
Beveridgean (α = 0) and the pure Bismarckian (α = 1), and consider how population
growth rate (n) affects the steady-state level of inequality in each case.
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The steady-state level of inequality is given by:
I¯ =
u(c¯y) + β
[
R{(1− θ(k¯))wh − c¯y}+ (1 + n)θ(k¯)(αwh + (1− α)w¯)]
u(c¯y) + β
[
R{(1− θ(k¯))wl − c¯y}+ (1 + n)θ(k¯)(αwl + (1− α)w¯)] .
By using this, we first consider the effect of a decrease in population growth on inequality.6
Proposition 6
(i) Suppose that the pension system is purely Beveridgean: α = 0. An inequality is (a)
increased by a lower population growth, i.e., ∂I¯/∂n < 0 if µ ≥ 0; and (b) decreased
by a lower population growth, i.e., ∂I¯/∂n > 0 if µ < 0 and A ∈ (Alow, Aˆ] where:
Aˆ ≡ −µ(w¯ − c¯
y)µw¯
(1 + n){(1 + n)− 2µw¯} .
(ii) Suppose that the pension system is purely Bismarckian: α = 1. An inequality is not
increased by lower population growth, i.e., ∂I¯/∂n ≥ 0 if (a) µ > 0 and 1 + n ≥ R,
(b) µ = 0, or (c) µ < 0 and 1 + n ≤ R.
We differentiate I¯ with respect to n to obtain:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
=
(
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
)
(wh − wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect via labor income
+
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
α(wh − wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect via Bismarckian part of the pension benefit
−
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
(1− α)w¯β(wh − wl) [R(1− θ(k¯)) + (1 + n)θ(k¯)α]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect via Beveridgean part of the pension benefit
.
(12)
This shows that population growth has effects on inequality through the three factors of
labor income and the Bismarckian and Beveridgean parts of the pension benefit. In what
follows, we consider how these three factors may interact to affect the steady-state level
of inequality.
6The effect of α on inequality is straightforward. Given that the tax rate θ¯ is independent of α
(Proposition 2), the numerator of the index is increasing in α and the denominator of the index is
decreasing in α. Therefore, we obtain ∂I¯/∂α > 0: a shift toward the Bismarckian part leads to an
expansion of the steady-state inequality.
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Let us consider an economy where the pension system is purely Beveridgean (α = 0):
the effect via the Bismarckian part disappears in this case. First, suppose that µ > 0. A
lower population growth rate leads to a lower tax rate (Proposition 4(i)) and thus produces
benefits for both types of young agents via labor income and losses for both types of old
agents via the Beveridgean part of the pension benefits. However, the marginal benefit
for type l young agents, wl, is lower than the marginal benefit for type h young agents,
wh, implying that the effect of a lower population growth via labor income is negative in
terms of equality. In addition, both types of old agents suffer the same degree of loss in
the Beveridgean part of the pension benefits, implying that the effect via the Beveridgean
part is negative in terms of equality. Given these two negative effects on equality, a lower
population growth rate leads to a higher level of inequality if α = 0 and µ > 0.
Second, suppose that µ = 0. In this case, population growth has no effect on the
politically determined tax rate (Proposition 4(i)), implying that the effect via labor income
disappears. There remains only the effect via the Beveridgean part of the pension benefit.
Therefore, a lower population growth rate leads to a higher level of inequality if α = 0 and
µ = 0. Third, suppose that µ < 0. A lower population growth rate leads to a higher tax
rate (Proposition 4(i)) and thus produces losses for both types of young agents via labor
income. However, the marginal loss for a type l agent, wl, is smaller than the marginal
loss for a type h agent, wh, implying that the effect of a lower population growth rate via
labor income is positive in terms of equality. The effect via the Beveridgean part of the
pension benefit is ambiguous because it contains two competing effects: a positive effect
caused by a decrease in the pension benefit because of a lower population growth rate,
and a negative effect caused by a decrease in the tax rate. The condition A ∈ (Alow, Aˆ]
ensures that the former overcomes the latter: inequality is decreased by a lower population
growth rate.
Next, consider the economy where the pension system is Bismarckian (α = 1). The
effect via the Beveridgean part disappears in this case. First, suppose that µ > 0. As in
the case when α = 0, a lower population growth rate yields a negative effect via labor
income in terms of equality. However, it yields a positive effect via the Bismarckian part
of the pension benefit in terms of equality. The condition 1 + n ≥ R ensures that the
positive effect overcomes the negative one. Second, suppose that µ = 0. In this case,
population growth has no effect on the politically determined tax rate (Proposition 4(i)),
implying that the effect via labor income disappears in this case. There remains only
the positive effect via the Bismarckian part of the pension benefit. Finally, suppose that
µ < 0. As in the case when α = 0, a lower population growth rate yields a positive effect
via labor income in terms of equality. However, the effect via the Bismarckian part is
ambiguous because it contains the two competing effects as explained in the case when
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α = 0. If 1 + n ≤ R, the sum of the positive effects overcomes the negative one: the
inequality level is decreased by a lower population growth rate.
The result established in Proposition 6 has the following policy implication. For coun-
tries with an aging population, the condition µ < 0 (i.e. βR < γ) is more likely to hold
because they feature greater political power of the elderly. Under this condition, the size
of the social security is increased by aging (Proposition 4). Given this result and the
condition that the population growth rate is low such that 1 + n ≤ R, aging leads to
a reduction of inequality via the increasing size of redistribution (Proposition 6). This
result is in sharp contrast to the effect of a decrease in mortality rates on consumption
inequality. When the decrease in mortality rates is responsible for population aging, con-
sumption inequality is expanded by aging because uninsured idiosyncratic events have
persistent impacts on individual income (Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Ohtake and Saito,
1998). Although our result is based on theoretical analysis with some restrictive assump-
tions, it indicates that the source of population aging is important in determining the
effect of aging on inequality.
6 Discussions
This section discusses the roles of two assumptions in the current analysis: the quasi-linear
utility function and an exogenously given pension scheme.
6.1 The Role of a Quasi-linear Utility Function
So far, we have assumed that the marginal utility of consumption in old age is constant
over time: U it = u(cyit ) + βc
oi
t+1. To consider the role of this assumption, let us make the
alternative assumption that the marginal utility of consumption in youth is constant over
time: U it = cyit + βv(c
oi
t+1). Under this assumption, it is shown below that the political
equilibrium generally fails to attain an interior solution.
Under the assumption of U it = cyit + βv(c
oi
t+1), the first-order condition of utility
maximization is given by βRv′(coit+1) = 1, or c
oi
t+1 = c¯
o ≡ v′−1(1/βR). This implies that
all income effects are absorbed by the consumption in youth. With this condition, the
saving of type i agent in period t is:
zit = (c¯
o − bit+1)/R =
(
c¯o − (1 + n)θ(kt+1)
(
αwi + (1− α)w¯)) /R.
With this saving function, the capital market clearing condition is written as:
(1 + n)kt+1 = c¯
o/R− (1 + n)θ(kt+1)w¯/R,
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which leads to ∂kt+1/∂θ(kt) = 0.
Given the βRv′(coit+1) = 1, the derivative of Gt with respect to θ(kt) is:
∂Gt
∂θ(kt)
= (1 + n)w¯
[
γ
βR
− 1 + 1 + n
R
· ∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
· ∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
]
.
We substitute ∂kt+1/∂θ(kt) = 0 into this equation to obtain:
∂Gt
∂θ(kt)
= (1 + n)w¯
(
γ
βR
− 1
)
.
This implies that the solution to the problem is generally given by θ(kt) = 0 or 1. There-
fore, the result implies that as long as we adopt a quasi-linear utility function for the
tractability of analysis, we must assume that the utility of consumption in old age is
linear in order to attain an interior solution.
6.2 An Endogenous Choice of a Pension System
We have considered the case in which the pension system, represented by the parameter
α, is exogenously given. We now consider an alternative case where α is chosen by voting,
and show that voters are indifferent between any levels of α under the current economic
environment.
Because we focus on Markov perfect equilibrium, we restrict the choice of a pension
system to the following Markovian policy function:
αt = ψ(kt),
where ψ is a stationary, differentiable function. The derivative of Gt with respect to ψ(kt)
leads to:
∂Gt
∂ψ(kt)
= γ · [λ(1 + n)θ(kt)(wh − w¯) + (1− λ)(1 + n)θ(kt)(wl − w¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#1)
+(1 + n) · [λβ(1 + n)θ(kt+1)(wh − w¯) + (1− λ)β(1 + n)θ(kt+1)(wl − w¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#2)
×∂ψ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
· ∂kt+1
∂ψ(kt)
= 0 ∀ψ(kt) ∈ [0, 1],
where the last equality holds because the terms (#1) and (#2) are zero. Therefore, there
is a continuum of solutions that maximize the objective function.
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The reason for this result is that in the current environment, there is no distortion
produced by α. In order to obtain a unique, interior solution of α, there is a need to
introduce a distortionary effect associated with the social security system. An example is
a tax base net of distortion given by φ(α) = [1−η(1−α)] where η identifies a distortionary
effect associated with the noncontributory part of the social security system (Conde-
Ruiz and Profeta, 2007). Given this distortion, the pension benefit for type i is bit+1 =
(1+n) ·τt+1 ·(αt+1wi+(1−αt+1)w¯) ·φ(αt+1). This extension may provide a richer political
implication, but definitely makes it impossible to solve the model analytically. Because
of this limitation, we have assumed α to be constant over time, and focused our attention
on the determination of the tax rate and its impact on inequality.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple political-economy model that includes intergenerational as
well as intragenerational distribution parts of social security. In particular, based on the
concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper focuses on the feedback
mechanism between current individuals’ decision on saving and future voting over social
security. In the presence of this mechanism, it considers how politics affects dynamic paths
of inequality and social security. In addition, it considers population aging resulting from a
decline in fertility rates, and analyzes the effects of aging on inequality and social security.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the feedback mechanism creates
various dynamic patterns of inequality and social security. In particular, these are affected
by the political power of the elderly. When their power is weak, the economy displays
a monotone increase or decrease in the size of social security and the level of inequality.
However, when the elderly’s political power is strong, the economy displays an oscillatory
path of inequality and social security. This result suggests that an aging economy asso-
ciated with great political power of the elderly will tend to fluctuate in inequality and
social security over time.
Second, the effects of aging on inequality differ between the two pension systems.
Under a pure Beveridgean scheme, aging increases (decreases) inequality if the political
power of the elderly is weak (strong). Under a pure Bismarckian scheme, aging decreases
inequality when the political power of the elderly is strong and the population growth rate
is low. These two results indicate that regardless of the social security system, an aging
economy may experience a decrease in inequality when a fertility decline is responsible
for population aging.
Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. First, we ignore population aging
resulting from a decrease in mortality rates. Joint analysis of decreases in mortality and
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fertility rates would produce a richer set of policy implications. Second, we abstract
the political determination of the social security scheme. An interesting extension would
be to consider the joint determination of the size of social security and the degree of
redistributiveness as discussed in Section 6.2. Third, for analytical convenience, we assume
a quasi-linear utility function and a linear production function. A natural extension of
the model is to relax this assumption. In a related work, Song (2007) presents a method
to derive an analytical solution under the assumption of a log-linear utility function and
a Cobb–Douglas production function. Utilizing his method would produce a wider set of
results and policy implications for aging, inequality and social security.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The derivative of Gt with respect to θ(kt)
The derivative of Gt with respect to θ(kt) yields:
∂Gt
∂θ(kt)
= γ
[
λ(1 + n)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)+ (1− λ)(1 + n) (αwl + (1− α)w¯)]
+(1 + n)
[
λ
{
u′(cyht )
(
−wh − ∂zht
∂θ(kt)
)
+ β
(
R
∂zht
∂θ(kt)
+ (1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯))}
+(1− λ)
{
u′(cylt )
(
−wl − ∂zlt
∂θ(kt)
)
+ β
(
R
∂zlt
∂θ(kt)
+ (1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwl + (1− α)w¯))}]
= γ(1 + n)w¯ + (1 + n)
[
λ
{
−βRwh + β(1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)}
+ (1− λ)
{
−βRwl + β(1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂θ(kt)
(
αwl + (1− α)w¯)}] ,
where the second equality comes from u′(cyht ) = βR and λ(1+n)
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)+(1−
λ)(1 + n)
(
αwl + (1− α)w¯) = (1 + n)w¯. Because we have (1 + n)kt+1 = (1− θ(kt))w¯− c¯y
in equilibrium, it follows that ∂kt+1/∂θ(kt) = −w¯/(1 + n). We substitute this into the
above equation to obtain:
∂Gt
∂θ(kt)
= γ(1 + n)w¯ + (1 + n)
[
λ
{
−βRwh − βw¯∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
(
αwh + (1− α)w¯)}
+ (1− λ)
{
−βRwl − βw¯∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
(
αwl + (1− α)w¯)}] .
Under the assumption of an interior solution, ∂Gt/∂θ(kt) = 0 leads to:
∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
= −µ ≡ −βR− γ
βw¯
.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We choose τ to maximize W˜ under the constraint of λzh + (1 − λ)zl ≥ 0. The solution
must satisfy the following first-order condition:
ηtβw¯{(1 + n)− ηR} − ξt = 0, (13)
where ξt is the Kuhn–Tucker multiplier associated with the constraint of λz
h+(1−λ)zl ≥
0. If 1 + n > ηR, (13) holds if and only if ξt > 0. This implies that λz
h + (1− λ)zl = 0,
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that is, τR = (w¯ − c¯y)/w¯. If 1 + n = ηR, (13) holds if and only if ξt = 0. This implies
that λzh+(1−λ)zl ≥ 0, that is, τR ∈ [0, (w¯− c¯y)/w¯]. Finally, if 1+n < ηR, (13) implies
that τR = 0.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From the capital market clearing condition (8), the steady-state level of capital is given
by:
k¯ =
w¯(1− A)− c¯y
(1 + n)− µw¯ .
k¯ > 0 is rewritten as:
A < Ahigh ≡ w¯ − c¯
y
w¯
.
From the law of motion of the equilibrium tax (9), the steady-state level of tax is given
by:
θ¯ =
(1 + n)A− µ(w¯ − c¯y)
(1 + n)− µw¯ .
Since the denominator is positive under Assumption 2, the inequality θ¯ ≥ 0 is rewritten
as (1 + n)A− µ(w¯ − c¯y) ≥ 0, that is,
A ≥ Alow ≡ µ(w¯ − c¯
y)
1 + n
.
Under Assumption 2, θ¯ ≤ 1 is rewritten as:
A ≤ (1 + n)− µc¯
y
1 + n
.
By direct calculation, we can find that Ahigh < {(1 + n) − µc¯y}/(1 + n) holds under
Assumption 2. Therefore, we have k¯ > 0 and θ¯ ∈ [0, 1) if A ∈ [Alow, Ahigh).
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The conditions of the parameters β,R, γ, and n for the stability property are immediately
found by equations (8) and (9). The remaining task is to provide the range of k0 that
ensures kt+1 > 0 and θt ∈ [0, 1) along the equilibrium path.
(i) The case of µ > 0
The law of motion for the stock of capital (8) implies that kt+1 > 0 is equivalent to:
kt >
c¯y − w¯
µw¯
+
A
µ
. (14)
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The policy function θt = A− µkt implies that:
θt < A− µ
{
c¯y − w¯
µw¯
+
A
µ
}
=
w¯ − c¯y
w¯
< 1,
where the first inequality comes from (14) and the second inequality comes from Assump-
tion 1. Given that µ > 0, θt ≥ 0 is rewritten as:
kt ≤ A
µ
. (15)
(14) and (15) lead to the set of kt that ensures kt+1 > 0 and θt ∈ [0, 1) along the equilibrium
path:
c¯y − w¯
µw¯
+
A
µ
< kt ≤ A
µ
. (16)
Therefore, setting kt = k0 in (16) leads to the set of the initial condition that ensures
kt+1 > 0 and θt ∈ [0, 1) for t ≥ 0.
(ii) The case of µ < 0
Taking the same procedure as in the case of µ > 0, we can show that kt+1 > 0 holds
if:
kt <
c¯y − w¯
µw¯
+
A
µ
,
θt < 1 always holds under Assumption 1; and θt ≥ 0 holds if A/µ ≤ kt. We have kt+1 > 0
and θt ∈ [0, 1) along the equilibrium path if:
A
µ
≤ kt < c¯
y − w¯
µw¯
+
A
µ
. (17)
Therefore, setting kt = k0 in (17) leads to the set of the initial condition that ensures
kt+1 > 0 and θt ∈ [0, 1) for t ≥ 0. ¥
8.5 Proof of Proposition 4
When µ = 0, the steady-state tax rate is θ¯ = A and is thereby independent of n and γ.
In what follows, we calculate ∂θ¯/∂n and ∂θ¯/∂γ for the case of µ 6= 0.
(i) The differentiation of θ¯ with respect to n leads to:
∂θ¯
∂n
=
µw¯
{(1 + n)− µw¯}2
[
−A+ w¯ − c¯
y
w¯
]
=
µw¯
{(1 + n)− µw¯}2 (−A+ Ahigh).
Given that A < Ahigh, ∂θ¯/∂n ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ 0.
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(ii) The differentiation of θ¯ with respect to γ leads to:
∂θ¯
∂γ
=
(1 + n)w¯
{(1 + n)− µw¯}2
∂µ
∂γ
(A− Ahigh) .
Because A− Ahigh < 0 and ∂µ/∂γ < 0 hold, we obtain ∂θ¯/∂γ > 0. ¥
8.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We differentiate It with respect to kt and rearrange the terms to obtain:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
(18)
= R
∂θ(kt)
∂kt
(−wh + wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + (1 + n)θ(kt+1)(1− α)w¯]
+(1 + n)
∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wh − wl) [α(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)− (1− α)w¯βR(1− θ(kt))] .
From the policy function and the capital market clearing condition, ∂θ(kt)/∂kt and
∂kt+1/∂kt are given by
∂θ(kt)/∂kt = ∂θ(kt)/∂kt = −µ,
∂kt+1/∂kt = µw¯/(1 + n).
(i) Suppose that µ > 0. We can rewrite (18) as
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
= R
∂θ(kt)
∂kt
(−wh + wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
+R
∂θ(kt)
∂kt
(−wh + wl)(1 + n)θ(kt+1)(1− α)w¯
+(1 + n)
∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wh − wl)α(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
+(1 + n)
∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wh − wl)(−1)(1− α)w¯βR(1− θ(kt)),
where the first and second terms are nonnegative, the third term is nonpositive, and the
fourth term is positive. Therefore, ∂It/∂kt > 0 holds if the sum of the first and the third
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terms are nonnegative. The sum is written as:
R
∂θ(kt)
∂kt
(−wh + wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + (1 + n)∂θ(kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wh − wl)α(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
= (−µ)(wh − wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
[
R− (1 + n) µw¯
1 + n
α
]
= (−µ)(wh − wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
[
(1− α)R + αγ
β
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality comes from −µ < 0, wh − wl > 0 and u(c¯y) − βRc¯y ≥ 0. Thus,
∂It/∂kt > 0 if µ > 0.
(ii) Suppose that µ < 0. Dividing both sides of (18) by (−µ)(wh − wl) > 0, we have:
1
(−µ)(wh − wl)
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
= (−R) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + (1 + n)θ(kt+1)(1− α)w¯]
+(1 + n)
µw¯
1 + n
[α(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)− (1− α)w¯βR(1− θ(kt)]
= (−1)(R− µw¯α)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)−R(1− α)w¯ [(1 + n)θ(kt+1) + µw¯β(1− θ(kt))] .
Under the assumption of µ < 0, we have:
0 > µw¯β(1− θ(kt)) > µw¯(1− θ(kt)),
implying that
−R(1− α)w¯ [(1 + n)θ(kt+1) + µw¯β(1− θ(kt))]
< −R(1− α)w¯ [(1 + n)θ(kt+1) + µw¯(1− θ(kt))] .
Therefore, we obtain:
1
(−µ)(wh − wl)
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
1
(−µ)(wh − wl)
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
< (−1)(R− µw¯α)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)−R(1− α)w¯ [(1 + n)θ(kt+1) + µw¯β(1− θ(kt))]
= (−1)(R− µw¯α)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
−R(1− α)w¯
[
(1 + n)
{
A− µ(w¯ − c¯
y)
1 + n
+
µw¯
1 + n
θ(kt)
}
+ µw¯β(1− θ(kt))
]
,
where the equality in the last line comes from the law of motion of the equilibrium tax.
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Rearranging the terms of this equation, we obtain:
1
(−µ)(wh − wl)
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
1
(−µ)(wh − wl)
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βcolt+1]
2 ∂It
∂kt
< (−1)(R− µw¯α)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)−R(1− α)w¯{(1 + n)A+ µc¯y},
where the first term on the right-hand side is nonpositive. This implies that ∂It/∂kt ≤ 0
holds if (1 + n)A+ µc¯y ≥ 0, i.e.,
A ≥ −µc¯
y
1 + n
. (19)
Given the definitions of Alow and Ahigh, we always have
Alow ≡ µ(w¯ − c¯
y)
1 + n
<
−µc¯y
1 + n
,
and we have −µc¯y/(1 + n) < Ahigh ≡ (w¯ − c¯y)/w¯ if and only if:
c¯y <
1 + n
(1 + n)− µw¯ w¯. (20)
Therefore, from (19) and (20), we can conclude that:
∂It/∂kt ≤ 0 if c¯y < 1 + n
(1 + n)− µw¯ w¯ and A ∈
[−µc¯y
1 + n
,Ahigh
)
.
¥
8.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We differentiate I¯ with respect to n and rearrange the terms to obtain:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
=
[
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
wh +
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
αwh
]
× [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]
+
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
(1− α)w¯β [R(1− θ(k¯))wl + (1 + n)θ(k¯)αwl]
−
[
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
wl +
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
αwl
]
× [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]
−
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
(1− α)w¯β [R(1− θ(k¯))wh + (1 + n)θ(k¯)αwh] ,
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which is reduced to:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
=
(
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
)
(wh − wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]
+
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
α(wh − wl) [(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)(1− α)w¯]
−
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
(1− α)w¯β(wh − wl) [R(1− θ(k¯)) + (1 + n)θ(k¯)α] .(21)
(i) Suppose that α = 0. (21) is reduced to:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
= (wh − wl)

(
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
){
(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) + β(1 + n)θ(k¯)w¯}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗1)
−
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
w¯βR(1− θ(k¯))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗2)
 . (22)
If µ > 0, ∂θ(k¯)/∂n > 0 (Proposition 4(i)). This implies that the sign of each term in
the square brackets is negative and thus ∂I¯/∂n < 0. If µ = 0, ∂θ(k¯)/∂n = 0 (Proposition
4(i)). Given this, (22) is rewritten as:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
= (wh − wl)(−1)θ(k¯)w¯βR(1− θ(k¯)) < 0.
If µ < 0, the sign of the term (*1) in (22) is positive; the sign of the term (*2) in (22) is
nonnegative if (1+n)(∂θ(k¯)/∂n)+θ(k¯) ≤ 0. Therefore, ∂I¯/∂n > 0 if (1+n)(∂θ(k¯)/∂n)+
θ(k¯) ≤ 0. The direct calculation leads to:
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯) =
(1 + n)A− µ(w¯ − c¯y)
(1 + n)− µw¯ + (1 + n)
−Aµw¯ + µ(w¯ − c¯y)
{(1 + n)− µw¯}2
=
(1 + n)A{(1 + n)− 2µw¯}+ µ(w¯ − c¯y)µw¯
{(1 + n)− µw¯}2 .
This implies that:
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯) ≷ 0⇔ A ≷ Aˆ ≡ −µ(w¯ − c¯
y)µw¯
(1 + n){(1 + n)− 2µw¯} . (23)
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The critical level of A, Aˆ, is larger than Alow under the assumption of (1 + n) − µw¯ > 0
(Assumption 2), and is smaller than Ahigh since Aˆ < 0 < Ahigh under the assumption of
µ < 0. Therefore, (1 + n)(∂θ(k¯)/∂n) + θ(k¯) ≤ 0 holds if µ < 0 and A ∈ (Alow, Aˆ].
(ii) Suppose that α = 1. (21) is reduced to:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
= (wh − wl)
[(
−R∂θ(k¯)
∂n
)
(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
+
{
(1 + n)
∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
}
(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
]
= (wh − wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)
[
(−R + (1 + n))∂θ(k¯)
∂n
+ θ(k¯)
]
.
Because (wh − wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y) ≥ 0 holds (Assumption 3), the sign of the term (−R +
(1 + n))(∂θ(k¯)/∂n) + θ(k¯) is a key to determine the sign of ∂I¯/∂n.
Recall that ∂θ(k¯)/∂n ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ 0 (Proposition 4 (i)). Given this result,
we have (−R + (1 + n))(∂θ(k¯)/∂n) + θ(k¯) > 0 if µ > 0 and 1 + n ≥ R; or if µ < 0 and
1 + n ≤ R. If µ = 0, (21) is further reduced to:
1
β
[u(c¯y) + βc¯ol]2
∂I¯
∂n
= (wh − wl)(u(c¯y)− βRc¯y)θ(k¯) ≥ 0,
where the inequality comes from wh−wl > 0 and u(c¯y)−βRc¯y ≥ 0 (Assumption 3). ¥
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the Ramsey tax rate and compares it to the politically
determined tax rates.
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Figure 2: Stability property of political equilibrium paths.
33
Figure 3: The figure displays the effect of a change in a population growth rate on the
steady-state level of capital. Panel (a) illustrates the case of µ > 0. Panel (b) illustrates
the case of µ < 0.
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